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American Hospitals in the Twentieth Century
hard in that, as Professor Stevens's history tends to show, they were trusted
too much too long.
One can only hope that health care providers reading Professor Stevens's
book will begin to understand this distrust and deal with it, rather than re-
act, as they too often do, with paranoia at the unhappy turn of events over-
taking their (overly) happy past.3°
ABORTION AND PROTECTION OF THE HUMAN FETUS: LEGAL
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Reviewed by Jude P. Dougherty, Ph.D. *
ABORTION AND PROTECTION OF THE HUMAN FETUS: LEGAL PROBLEMS
IN A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE is at once a valuable and a depressing
survey of abortion practice and law throughout most of the West and Japan.
There are specific reports on Austria, England, France, Ireland, the Federal
Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United States.
There is a collective report on abortion policy in European Socialist Coun-
tries ' and another on International Law and the Protection of the Fetus.2 No
attempt is made to address the practice of abortion in the Southern Hemi-
sphere. I say "depressing," since anyone who, for biological or metaphysical
reasons, is certain that the human being exists from conception is bound to
30. Of course there's more to it than I've stated. Consider the wildly fluctuating attitudes
toward technical expertise in our hospitals. For example, during the first half of this century,
women insisted on giving birth in a hospital under the care of M.D.'s (as opposed to mid-
wives), who advocated maximum pain-relief. But once hospital delivery became the over-
whelming norm, along with anesthesia and fetal monitoring, women began insisting on giving
birth in their homes, along with minimal intervention in labor, through the care of sympathetic
midwives (as opposed to obstetricians). How can you win? See Cullen, Book Review, The
Times Literary Supp. (London), May 18-24, 1990, at 525, col. 1 (reviewing THE POLITICS OF
MATERNITY CARE: SERVICES FOR CHILDBEARING WOMEN IN TWENTIETH CENTURY BRIT-
AIN (J. Garcia, R. Kilpatrick & M. Richards eds. 1990)).
* Dean, School of Philosophy, The Catholic University of America.
1. Zielinska, European Socialist Countries, in ABORTION AND PROTECTION OF THE
HUMAN FETUS: LEGAL PROBLEMS IN A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 241 (1987) [herein-
after ABORTION].
2. Shelton, International Law on Protection of the Fetus, in ABORTION, supra note 1, at 1.
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be distraught by the widespread taking of human life, largely in the interest
of sexual pleasure.
Remarkable is the change in outlook concerning the morality of abortion
which has occurred from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries. Until
recent decades moral opinion in the West was fairly united in condemning
abortion. We have only to note the almost universal use in the medical pro-
fession of the Hippocratic Oath. Until recent advances in biology, there may
have been doubts concerning the exact time a conceptus becomes a human
being, given the time-honored Aristotelian doctrine that matter has to be in
proximate potentiality to receive the form.' In the Middle Ages, Aquinas, in
addressing this issue, relied upon common opinion in his speculations con-
cerning the moment of hominization and elected for delayed hominization;
but on his principles, even if the moment of hominization was unknown, the
unborn was not to be aborted because from the moment of conception it was
at least potential human life.4
Modern biology has shown how complex the microscopic can be. Mini-
mally, we know today that at approximately the end of the second week
after fertilization, a developmentally individual embryo is formed and, from
that point on, human development is a continuum.5 I say "minimally" be-
cause geneticists will affirm that, from the instant of conception, a separate
human life is present with its own unique genetic pattern with all the chro-
mosomes and genes which will later determine the physical characteristics of
the individual from body structure to hair color.6 Some recent studies sug-
gest that "polarization" occurs at the moment of conception; the head of the
offspring will be formed when the sperm enters the ovum.
7
One of the most valuable essays in the book is Frankowski's study of the
history of abortion legislation and related issues in the United States.8 The
3. For a careful and comprehensive history of the ancients and medievals on abortion,
see J. CONNERY, ABORTION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVE
(1977); see also ARISTOTLE, On the Generation of Animals, in 5 THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
736 (J. Smith & W. Ross trans. 1912).
4. See T. AQUINAS, 1 SUMMA THEOLOGICA 574 (Q. 118, art. 2) (Fathers of the Eng.
Dominican Province trans. 1947-48); 2 SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES 263 (bk. 2, ch. 89) (Eng.
Dominican Fathers trans. 1923); 1 QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE DE POTENTIA DEI 155 (Q. 3,
art. 9) (Eng. Dominican Fathers trans. 1952).
5. See generally R. RUGH & L. SHETTLES, FROM CONCEPTION TO BIRTH (1972); S.
GILBERT, DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY (1988); Ashley, A Critique of the Theory of Delayed
Hominization, in AN ETHICAL EVALUATION OF FETAL EXPERIMENTATION 113 (D. McCar-
thy & A. Moraczewski eds. 1976).
6. See GILBERT, supra note 5, at 30-58.
7. See id. at 92. Compare Lehtonen, Cytokeratins in Oocytes and Preimplantation Em-
bryos of the Mouse, 22 CURRENT TOPICS IN DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 155-56 (1987) (dis-
cussing alternative polarization theories).
8. Frankowski, United States of America, in ABORTION, supra note 1, at 17.
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story has been told before, notably by John Noonan, 9 but it bears reviewing.
In 1900, every state in the Union had statutes prohibiting abortion except
within narrowly defined limits. The pro-abortion movement started in the
early 1960's with strong support from the American Civil Liberties Union
and the Planned Parenthood Federation of America.' Between the mid-
1960's and 1972, nineteen states were persuaded to relax their abortion laws,
largely by adopting legislation that followed the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code, published in 1962."1 "Under the Code, abortion re-
mained criminal unless the doctor considered that the mother's physical or
mental health was in danger, or that the baby was likely to be formed with
serious mental or physical problems, or that the pregnancy was the result of
felonious intercourse."' 2 The other thirty-one states did not change their
laws despite the activity of pro-abortion pressure groups.13 It is worth not-
ing that the movement toward the relaxation of anti-abortion laws was not a
movement initiated by legislative assemblies. If legislation occurred, it was
as a result of recommendations by commissions or other study groups which
frequently became policy advocates. In the United States it was a judicial
decision by the Supreme Court which invalidated most state laws regulating
abortion. 14
Reports from Europe vary. In Sweden, within the span of a half-century,
abortion has expanded from a few hundred emergency cases to a socially
acceptable way of ending early pregnancy, such that by 1983 one-third of all
pregnancies were terminated by abortion. One-half of all women of child-
bearing age have had one abortion, and one-third have had two or more.
Not only that, but forty-four percent of all children are born out of wedlock.
Alvar Nelson reports that moral resistance against abortion has all but
ceased, religion having lost its grip on the citizenry.'"
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the Strafgesetzbuch, or Penal Code,
until 1976 treated abortion as a criminal act except when performed under
certain narrowly defined conditions. German law governing abortion dates
to the Penal Code of 1871, which in spite of many alterations remained fun-
damentally the same until 1976, when many of the traditional restrictions
were relaxed. 16 With the unity of the two Germanies the issue may again be
9. J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE, ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES (1979).
10. Frankowski, supra note 8, at 21.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 22.
13. Id.
14. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
15. See generally Nelson, Sweden, in ABORTION, supra note 1, at 189-212.
16. See generally G6ssel, Federal Republic of Germany, in ABORTION, supra note 1, at
129-50.
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addressed as some seek a law that will reflect the even more permissive East
German abortion law. At this writing the outcome is uncertain.
On one side of the debate are the German Bishops and the Federal Cham-
ber of German Physicians. On the other are arrayed the representatives of
the women's liberation movement and other groups, including the trade un-
ions and the Evangelical Church, which favor some form of compromise.
The German Catholic Bishops have consistently taught: "The day of con-
ception makes life untouchable. Unborn life is not at the mother's disposal,
because the child within his mother's body is not part of that body, but is an
autonomous life of its own."' 17 The Federal Chamber of Physicians has
taken the following position: "Physicians must realize that their duty is not
to solve social problems by abortion, but to preserve unborn life."' 8 But the
1976 law, giving priority to the pregnant woman's right to personal freedom
over the protection of unborn human life, was passed by a majority coalition
of the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Free Democrats (FDP). 9 Under the
new law, a woman has a right to terminate a pregnancy in four situations:
medical-social, eugenic, ethical, and "general state of distress."2 Destruc-
tion of the fetus is permitted for medical-social reasons throughout the preg-
nancy up until the beginning of the birth process, for eugenic reasons within
the first twenty-two weeks of conception, and for "ethical" (felonious inter-
course) and "state of distress" reasons within the first twelve weeks.2 To
justify abortion when its purpose is to avoid a "state of distress," two condi-
tions must be met: 1) the "state of distress" must be too grave to require the
pregnant woman to give birth, and 2) the destruction of the unborn must be
the only way of averting the danger in a way that is tolerable to her. The
"state of distress" defined by the 1976 law may result from familial, eco-
nomic, or other burdens of extraordinary harshness. Familial reasons may
include the judgment that the birth of the child would mean the neglect of
other children or relatives in the household requiring special care. Examples
of "extraordinary harshness" include the possibility that continued preg-
nancy would prevent the woman's further education and thus severely en-
danger "her whole path of life.",22
While the law clearly has been enfeebled by the numerous conditions that
are recognized to justify abortion, the thrust of the German law remains the
protection of unborn life. Unborn life is meant to be penally protected not
17. Id. at 131.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 146.
20. Id. at 142.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 143.
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only by declaring abortion punishable, but also by imposing duties on the
mother and on the attendant physician that are in the interest of the un-
born's right to life. Before an abortion is performed the woman must request
social and medical counseling. Social counseling is intended to encourage
the mother to decide freely to continue pregnancy. Physicians may serve as
counsellors only if they agree not to perform the abortion if the woman so
elects in spite of counseling. Practice varies from state to state with some
parts of the country far more lenient in their compliance with an already
weak law. The law is so weak that many regard the present Code to be
unconstitutional because in practice it fails to guarantee the constitutionally
demanded protection of unborn life. This fear is reinforced by the evidence;
since 1976, the number of abortions has risen dramatically from forty-three
per thousand live-births to one hundred and forty-six in 1982.23
As in the United States, in nearly every European country the division
between pro-life and pro-choice advocates is deep. Any explanation is
bound to be complex. Throughout the West the liberalization of abortion
laws occurred in the 1970's largely as a result of the adoption by the judici-
ary and by political parties of an intellectual outlook at war with the tradi-
tional morality and its customary institutional defenders. One philosophical
or religious outlook replaced another, and with the new outlook came a new
way of structuring society. Abortion was but one facet of the larger restruc-
turing. At one level, the permissive attitude toward abortion is the logical
outcome of the sexual revolution. If sexual fulfillment is given priority over
life's other goals, and this is commonly accepted, restraint is difficult to pro-
mote through moral persuasion: individuals tend to do no more than is de-
manded of them under sanction of law or public opinion. It should be
obvious to anyone who considers the evidence that the unborn are human
beings and today few rarely argue the opposite. Rather, the sloganeering is
on "bodily freedom," with the human life issue completely ignored.
The secular mind-set of intellectuals trained in the spirit of the Enlighten-
ment governs the media and the academy. It is at once in opposition to
Biblical morality and to the religion which it fosters. Though many social
observers have pointed to the destructive effect of Enlightenment morality,
its negative effects for the individual and for society are yet to be acknowl-
edged (or even noticed) by its advocates. That morality was designed by an
elite for an elite; the masses were to be controlled by insisting on their adher-
ence to traditional norms and by holding them liable to customary sanctions.
It will be remembered that Voltaire urged the eradication of Christianity
from the world of higher culture. But he was willing to have it remain in the
23. Id. at 148.
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stables and in the scullery, mainly as a moral force, lest a servant class eman-
cipated from the traditional sources of morality might pilfer.2 4
It is a truism that, given enough time, intellectual conflict will manifest
itself in political confrontation. It is no accident that Christian democratic
parties, whatever their name, are usually defenders of a Biblical or tradi-
tional morality. They emphasize self-restraint, obligation, the common
good, and spiritual goals. Socialist parties, again, whatever their name, are
usually secular in outlook, embracing a naturalistic humanism that places
the emphasis on temporal achievement. If the grave is the end of life, human
goals are to be achieved here and now or not at all. Strangely, an outlook
that starts with the declared goal of "making this a better place for future
generations" has time and again, as we can see from numerous examples in
Asia and Eastern Europe, resorted to coercion in the practical order, exclu-
siveness in the academic, and a self-destructive permissiveness in the moral.
Frankowski and Cole in this collection of reports have studiously re-
frained from imposing moral judgment; yet, in spite of what must have been
their charge to the contributors, nearly all find it difficult to avoid moral
judgment as they point to profoundly divisive outlooks and call for more
careful considerations. One cannot avoid the impression that so much tak-
ing of life has resulted in a certain callousness in those societies or groups
where it has become prevalent.
With the collapse of Marxism in the economic order, perhaps the time is
ripe for a study of its consequences and that of other secular humanisms in
the social order. In 1929, Lenin wrote: "To engage women in productive
work for the society, to liberate them from 'home slavery,' to free them from
stupefying and humiliating dependence, so that they do not have to look
constantly and exclusively after the home and children-this is the primary
task. ' , 25 As Eleonora Zielinska has pointed out, "Mass scale 'liberation' of
women from the traditional social roles would not have been possible with-
out accepting the idea of family planning, including the availability of abor-
tions."2 6 In the Soviet Union permissive legislation with respect to abortion
was followed by such a downturn in the birth rate that Stalin in 1936 re-
versed the policy and introduced a general ban on abortion. The prohibition
against abortion continued until 1955 when a new liberalization occurred.
Zielinska in her chapter, European Socialist Countries, finds that a permis-
sive attitude is common to all socialist countries whether in Europe or
elsewhere.27
24. P. GRAY, VOLTAIRE'S POLITICS: THE POET AS REALIST 259 (1959).
25. Zielinska, supra note 1, at 254 (quoting LENIN, 30 LENIN 418 (1929)).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 242.
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While ABORTION AND PROTECTION OF THE HUMAN FETUS settles
neither the moral question nor the more basic metaphysical issues at stake,
as a result of the data presented, it clearly suggests the need for principled
inquiry. The basic question remains: Is there any freedom which justifies
such a large scale taking of human life?
MEDICAL LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS. By Ian Kennedy and
Andrew Grubb. London: Butterworths. 1989. 1210 Pp.
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Reviewed by George P. Smith, I1*
I.
Although human anatomy-and physiology are taken as the same world
wide, individual cultures differ in the basic organization and the delivery of
health care services. Thus, while Americans are regarded as probably more
health conscious than any other culture, it remains the only industrialized
country (with the exception of South Africa) that has failed to create a sys-
tem of national health insurance. The underlying rationale for this policy is
said to be cost-this in spite of the fact that the Nation spends more than
twelve percent of its Gross National Product on health care.'
While the traditional means for affording access to goods and services in a
capitalistic economy is the free market system, Americans have been unwill-
ing in the past for the most part-to either condone or accept financial abil-
ity as the central means for distributing health care. Responding to this
attitude, or consensus, the United States Congress established both Medicare
and Medicaid programs to deal with the commitment to provide health care
services regardless of ability to pay.2 Recent surveys show, however, that
while the American public is concerned about the idea or principle of pro-
viding health care for all who are in need, and catastrophic health care coy-
* Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America.
1. B. FURROW, S. JOHNSON, T. JOST & R. SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW CASES, MATERI-
ALS AND PROBLEMS xxxi (1987) [hereinafter HEALTH LAW CASES]; see Hall, The Malpractice
Standard under Health Care Cost Containment, 17 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 347 (1989).
2. Silver, From Baby Doe to Grandpa Doe: The Impact of the Federal Age Discrimination
Act on the "Hidden" Rationing of Medical Care, 37 CATH. U.L. REV. 993, 1000 (1988); see
also K. DAVIS & D. ROWLAND, MEDICARE POLICY: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HEALTH AND
LONG-TERM CARE (1986).
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